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INTEGRATION, DISINTEGRATION OR FROZEN CONFLICT: POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENT SCENARIOS FOR TEMPORARILY OCCUPIED DONBAS AND PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARDS THEM

This article is based on the analysis of several probable scenarios of Donbas conflict development and/or resolution. This issue is of outmost importance for Ukraine, as despite the ongoing military actions in Donbas and high risks of further escalation, the future development of temporarily occupied territories remains one of the top priorities for Ukraine. Since this problem is unprecedented for the independent Ukraine, the participants of the negotiation process, media and academia analyze foreign experience of conflict resolution which can be relevant for Ukraine. The article is focused on the following probable scenarios of conflict resolution: reintegration (Bosnian, Croatian and German scenario), disintegration (Pakistani scenario) or frozen conflict (Transnistria scenario). Both internal political situation in Ukraine as well as geopolitical conditions imply that Ukraine's political and diplomatic choice might be narrowed down to some variation of the Bosnian scenario, yet this model will only create an illusion of conflict resolution, while in the reality it will be simply localized. Such development can significantly undermine Euro-Atlantic aspirations of Ukraine, as the entire Donbas region has a very different take on Euro-Atlantic integration, and it will be able to influence Ukraine's home and foreign agenda. Also, there is a rather high possibility for the break-away Donbas to follow the footprint of Transnistrian conflict. Which means that Ukraine can potentially get a frozen conflict on its territory, ready to deteriorate any time. Three other scenarios are less likely. The Croatian scenario can be possible only if Russian Federation stops financial, material and military support to so-called Donetsk and Luhansk "people's" republics, which will give Kyiv an opportunity to liberate this region within a military campaign. The German scenario is time- and resource consuming, as it's not about physical joining of certain populated areas, it's about change of the mental picture on both sides of the contact line. The Pakistani scenario might seem beneficial at the first glance, as disintegrating a breakaway area lifts further financial responsibilities for its recovery, yet it might plant a time bomb for Ukraine's security and territorial integrity, a such practices can be potentially applied to other regions of Ukraine.

Key words: *conflict in Donbas, reintegration, conflict resolution, scenarios of conflict resolution, temporarily occupied areas.*

Formulation of the problem. The military conflict between the Ukrainian military forces and Russia-backed separatists reinforced by Russian regular troops in Eastern Ukraine territory called Donbas started in 2014 and still ongoing. Donbas became a venue of the one of the largest post-Wall humanitarian disasters in Europe after the Balkan wars on 1990's. At the time of publication, the war in Donbas is the only active armed conflict in Europe. Despite the official ceasefire agreements [1], hostilities by the occupant forces frequently reoccur, as proven by daily OSCE/SMM reports. The situation is aggravated by November – December 2021 Russian military build-up at the Ukrainian border [2], which became one of the most important topics on the European and Transatlantic agenda [3; 4; 5]. Given the rapidly changing domestic and international circumstances with no clear sign indicating that the conflict would cease in any foreseeable future, and with the constant threat of escalation or even full-scale military intervention from Russia, it's hard to predict exact or even most probable development trajectory for Donbas. Yet, planning of post-conflict recovery agenda is the essential component of any conflict resolution process, thus possible scenarios of post-conflict development should be carefully analyzed by the relevant stakeholders – government and non-government sector, international development partners, media, academia etc. For the independent Ukraine the process of military conflict resolution is unprecedented, so this calibration is mainly built on the relevant foreign experiences. In the Donbas case the following "scenarios" (in this case – scenario-based forecast of further development of the situation) are on the table:

– reintegration (Bosnian, Croatian and German scenario);

– disintegration (Pakistani scenario);

– frozen conflict (Transnistria or Abkhazia / South Ossetia scenario).

Each of the abovementioned scenarios has its advantages and shortcomings, some even can plant a time bomb threat to Ukraine's national security and territorial integrity. Thus, it's crucial to foresee possible consequences and analyze public attitudes towards that or another scenario. Given that there is still large number of people living on the occupied areas, it's important to examine surveys and opinion polls revealing their position and expectations from the current conflict resolution process and juxtapose them with the relevant data collected on both temporarily occupied and government-controlled areas of Donbas, as well as nationwide.

Analysis of recent research and publications. The subject of conflict in eastern Ukraine is in the focus of media attention and academic research both in Ukraine and abroad. Exploration of this complex issue is conducted in different dimensions: peculiarities of social, political, economic and cultural development of Donbas (S. Kulchytsky, L. Yakubova, V. Levytsky); history of Donbas and its impact on regional identity (H. Kuromiya, D. Kazanaky, M. Vorotyntseva, V. Kulyk); impact of Euromaidan revolution of 2013–2014 (M. McFaul, I. Bekeshkina); identity transformations in Donbas since

the beginning of conflict (V. Sereda, G. Sasse, A. Lackner); role of Russia and hybrid warfare (V. Gurzhy, V. Hlazunov, A. Willson); differences and similarities of armed conflicts in post-USSR countries and worldwide (R. Khalikov) scenarios of conflict development and post-conflict recovery (O. Haran, M. Yakovlev, M. Zolkina, A. Motyl). Also, numerous analytical materials prepared by research centers (ZOiS, International Centre for Policy Studies, Center New Europe, Kalmius Group etc.) make a profound contribution to the research of Donbas conflict and mapping solution strategies. Yet, while talking about application of foreign practices to Donbas conflict resolution one should take into account the local context and especially public opinions. While researchers are often focused on analyzing what people have behind their back (historical preconditions, causes and consequences) it's also important to understand what people see in front of them. Thus, there is a need for comprehensive analysis which would include both theoretical elaborations and practical findings.

The purpose of the article is to systematize the above-mentioned scenarios of Donbas conflict development and define people's attitudes towards them based on the available survey data. The article is addressing the following **tasks**: 1) provide critical review of the existing scenarios of situation development; 2) define public approval or disapproval for each of them based on the available open data; 3) identify people's expectations regarding conflict resolution in Donbas. Theis article does not analyze the history of the conflict, its socio-political causes, it's strictly focused on the analysis of probable developments from people's point of view based on sociologic research.

Presenting main material. Starting from 2014 and till now, lots of scenarios of conflict settlement for Eastern Ukraine have been elaborated and discussed on the European level. A research paper prepared by Kyiv-based think tank International Centre for Policy Studies [6] with support of Renaissance Foundation analyzed 4 probable models of conflict resolution in Donbas based on recent historic precedents: Bosnian, Croatian, Pakistani and German (post-Wall) model. Another analysis [7] elaborated by Kyiv-based center New Europe supported by the Renaissance Foundation and Embassy of Sweden defined six scenarios, among which: status quo, frozen conflict, reintegration of Donbas based on decentralization principles (on Ukraine's terms), autonomy to Donbas, liberation of temporarily occupied territories by military forces, Russia's offensive into the territory of Ukraine.

The purpose of further analysis is not to define the best of the most probable reintegration model, but to examine how people on both sides of the contact line see further development. Also, it's worth mentioning that causes of each conflict are totally different from those in Ukraine, so they are limited to brief description. The focus is placed on the analysis of possible development scenarios, except for the full-scale military invasion from Russia, as this analysis should be done by military studies experts. Thus, the article is focused on the following scenarios

1) Bosnian (autonomy);
2) Croatian (military liberation of temporarily occupied territories);
3) German (peaceful reunion);
4) Pakistani (independence to the break-away territories);
5) Transnistria / Abkhazia / South Ossetia (frozen conflict, or, in other terms, co-existence under military de-escalation / ceasefire/truce).

The ***Bosnian scenario*** envisages restauration or preservation of a country's territorial integrity under condition of federalization. After a bloody civil war between Bosnian Muslim, Croatian Catholic and Serbian Orthodox communities, Dayton peace accords were signed in 1995. They paved a path to establishing a new country – Bosnia and Hercegovina. Although the bloodshed was brought to the end, Dayton accords could not reconcile the people. Dr. Argyro Kartsonaki a research fellow at Institute for Conflict, Cooperation and Security at the University of Birmingham argues that the Dayton agreement basically relocated the conflict from the military domain to the political one [8]. A. Kartsonaki explains, that in Bosnian conflict there was no winner, who could set the rules of the game so each party remained unsatisfied with the outcome: Bosnian Muslims were forced to conclude a compromise at the moment when they started winning in the military domain, Bosnian Serbs didn't get a chance to unite the Bosnian territories they controlled with the "big" Serbia (Federative Republic of Yugoslavia at that time), yet they managed to legitimize their lands in the form of Respublika Srpska, which became one of the constituents of current Bosnia and Hercegovina (BiH). Bosnian Croats managed neither to merge with Croatia nor to gain autonomy for their territories, thus they had to agree to the federal governance. Further political and social development of BiH indicate that despite the military conflict was put out, society remains highly polarized and political confrontation still continues [8] and remains Europe's "gunpowder box" [9; 10].

A similar tendency can be traced in Ukraine. The Ukrainian version of the Bosnian model has been elaborated at "Minsk negotiations", which became name to regular trilateral talks of Ukraine, Russia and OSCE with unformal participation of representatives of self-proclaimed Luhansk People's Republic and Donetsk People's Republic (LPR/DPR). One of the key outcomes of the Minsk negotiations is so called "Steinmeier formula" that envisages conducting of local election in the break-away areas under Ukrainian electoral legislation and OSCE/ODIHR monitoring [11; 12].

Yet, implementation of the "formula" is far from smooth, as Ukraine and Russia view this process differently: Ukraine agrees to hold election on the break-away territories only when all the security criteria are met (demilitarization of separatists units, restoration of Ukraine's control over eastern border etc.), while Russia insists on giving priority to the political component (election, special status for Donbas etc.) Official Kyiv doesn't agree to the Russians initiatives, any subjectivation of LPR/DPR is posing a big threat to Ukraine's political stability. Researchers agree that providing

the break-away Donbas with significant level of autonomy (through federalization or any other form like "special autonomous status") would give them a disproportional amount of influence and a voice in Ukraine's political decision making [13]. Thus, the idea of federalization promoted by Russia as a solution for Donbas crisis, is negatively accepted by the Ukrainian society in general. According to a nationwide survey commissioned by International Republican Institute and conducted by Rating Group in March 2014, 64% respondents said that Ukraine should remain a unitary state, and only 14% supported the idea of federalization. The biggest number of pro-federalization respondents was spotted in eastern regions of Ukraine – 26% [14].

In April 2014 Ukrainian reputable weekly Dzerkalo Tyzhnya (DT) published a survey conducted specifically in 8 oblasts of south-east Ukraine (Odesa, Mykolayiv, Kherson, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhya, Luhansk and Donetsk), which confirmed high demand for federalization in the mentioned region – almost 25%. At the same time, Luhansk and Donetsk had much stronger feeling for federalization than the average in the southeast – 41,9% of Luhansk and 38,4% of Donetsk respondents preferred this option [15]. This phenomenon is not new – Donbas "regional" self-identification and sympathy for federalism prominently stood out since Ukraine became an independent state in 1991 [16, p. 14–28] and was often used by the local pro-Russian politicians for consolidation of electorate according to simple model "us (Donbas) against them (Kyiv, western Ukraine)".

Further nationwide surveys conducted after 2014 till now just proved once again that more than 50% of Ukrainians have highly negative nationwide public attitude to federalization: 59% against federalization according to KIIS survey 2015 [17] and 63% against federalization according to Razumkov Center survey 2019 [18].

In general, any idea of granting Donbas increased powers other than provided by Ukraine's decentralization reform face strong public repulse: "autonomy", "special autonomy" or "special status" are negatively perceived in Ukraine overall and in government-controlled areas of Donbas (GCA), and enjoy some, but not overwhelming support in so called DPR/LPR. Thus, according to Berlin based Center for Eastern European and International Studies ZOiS survey conducted in both GCA and temporarily occupied territories in 2019, 30% of GCA residents would support autonomous status for Donbas within Ukraine and almost 65% would like to see it as a part of Ukraine without any special status, as it was before 2014 [19, p. 11]. On the occupied areas 31% would favor autonomy status within Ukraine and 27% support autonomy status within Russia [19, p. 12]. The DT commissioned survey in 2019 revealed that only 13% of people in the occupied areas would like to stay in Ukraine with a "special status" [20]. Nationwide support for autonomy for DPR/LPR remains at 25% level [17]. Yet this figure may vary depending on how the question is framed. In May 2019 a group of three reputable think tanks conducted a survey in which, among other questions, they asked respondents to make their best

choice amongst three options: autonomy within Ukraine, liberation through the military offensive or isolation [21]. The autonomy was supported by 39.9% nationwide, while the two other options received 17,3% and 18,5% correspondingly. Oleksiy Haran, professor of political studies at Kyiv Mohyla Academy, however, explains that there was no "return Donbas on previous terms and conditions" option so, when facing radical options, majority of respondents tend to choose a compromise [22].

Thus, there is no clear indication that granting special autonomous status to Donbas will be welcome on both sides on the contact line and will bring long awaited solution to the Donbas problem. It might be viewed as a lesser evil if the other options are even more risky. Researchers in the above-mentioned reports by New Europe and International Centre for Policy Studies warn that indulging the break-away territories with central government type powers and allowing them to shape national and international agenda would pose big threats to Ukraine: reinforced positions of Russia in Ukraine's political agenda, social tensions, "bad influence" on other regions, who can claim autonomy based on historical or ethnical preconditions.

Croatian scenario, unlike the Bosnian one, envisages fast military campaign that allows to destroy the enemy and reestablish control over the occupied territories, like Croatia did in 1995 having performed military Operation Storm [23] and regained control over the breakaway Krajina. Collapse of Yugoslavia in early 1990's led to a military confrontation between independent Croatia and Serbian enclaves on its territory, supported by Serbia (back then – Federative Republic of Yugoslavia). The conflict broke over a right to control eastern regions of Croatia bordering Serbia and other Serb-populated enclaves. Croatian population who used to live on these territories, underwent pressure and ethnic cleansing. Croatian government estimates over 76 000 Croats were forced out of their homes, over 2 500 killed and over 8 000 wounded [24, p. 2]. The self-proclaimed republics Srpska Krajina and Knin Krajina were enjoying strong military and material support from the former federal center (just like self-proclaimed LPR/DPR enjoy support from Russian Federation). In 1995, after the 4-year long tensions between Croatia and the self-proclaimed enclaves, Zagreb backed by the West made a decisive move – operations Flash and Storm, which brought the end to military confrontation in the country and made Serbian military and civilians retreat to Serbia.

The Croatian model looked very appealing to Ukraine. At the beginning of the conflict and in summer 2014 Ukraine was following the Croatian path, steadily advancing eastwards and fighting the militarized squads of self-proclaimed "republics" off. Yet intervention of the Russian forces and weapon supply made Ukrainian army to stop offensive [25]. Multiple opinion surveys conducted since then proved that the liberation of the occupied areas by military forces can be considered as a possible option, yet not the best one yet: 28% according to the KIIS survey 2015 [17] (two options were given – military liberation campaign vs. peace talk in Minsk

format), 12% according to GfK 2018 survey [26], 17,3% in Rating/Social Monitoring/Ukrainian Institute for Sociology Research survey [21] (vs. two options – granting autonomy to Donbas or its isolation), 23,5% according to Razumkov Center survey 2019 [18].

Although since 2014 Ukrainian military has significantly improved both equipment and fighting skills, it will need additional resources and strong international back-up for the offensive in the future. Yet, as of December 2021 the Croatian scenario for Donbas conflict resolution seem to be very unlikely given the Russian military build-up along Ukraine's eastern border [27] which can evolve into a fully-fledged invasion [28].

German (Post-Wall Berlin) scenario envisages reintegration of temporarily occupied territory with its historic center, just like German Democratic Republic and West Germany did after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. According to professor of Humbold Univerzitat zu Berlin Michael Burda and Jennifer Hunt from the University of Montreal in their article "From Reunification to Economic Integration: Productivity and the Labor Market in Eastern Germany" write that the reunification of Germany became a typical example of economic integration of two neighboring regions at different levels of development [29, p. 2–3]. The key advantage of the Berlin model is a peaceful reintegration and harmonization of development of both parts. This model could be beneficial for Ukraine, yet it faces some strong obstacles. As numerous surveys reveal, only a small fraction of people living on the temporarily occupied territories want to reunite with Ukraine, while the majority gravitate towards Russia. The DT survey 2019 conducted in the self-proclaimed "republics" shows that only "5,1% respondents what to be a part of Ukraine as before". Another 13,4% would agree to re-join Ukraine if granted a special status. And over 50% of respondents would like to join Russia [20].

Yet on the other side of the contact line, in GCA as well as in the rest of Ukraine, the idea of peaceful/diplomatic return of Donbas with its further integration on pre-war terms is very popular. According to ZOiS surveys conducted in 2016 and 2019, steady 65% of people living in GCA would like to embrace the breakaway parts and live "like before" [19, p. 11]. On the nationwide level this idea is supported by over a half of respondents according to various surveys: 54,3% according to Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation [30] and 56% according to the Razumkov Center sociological service, June 2019 [18].

Pakistani scenario is the most radical, as it envisages complete separation of a break-away part from the historical center with following establishing of an independent state. This scenario was developed during the armed conflict between West Pakistan (now Pakistan) and East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), which after decades of bloodshed resulted in establishing of independent Bangladesh. Dr. Siegfried Wolf professor of political studies at Heidelberg University underlines that since the creation of independent state of Pakistan in 1947, eastern and western provinces kept rather

tense relations [31]. The key difference between the two regions were based on linguistic grounds: west Pakistan spoke Urdu, while east Pakistan spoke Bengali. Islamabad was promoting Urdu and suppressing Bengali speaking community, which led to creation of Bengali nationalist movement, which later evolved into a powerful political force and fought for the rights and freedoms of Bengali population. Islamabad's response was brutal: political repressions, mass murder and genocide. In 1971 after a year-long military confrontation known as Bangladesh Liberation War, Pakistan finally surrendered withdrew its troops from the eastern part.

The described above situation is a post-colonial conflict and it would be wrong to compare it to the situation in Donbas from the viewpoint of cause and consequences. Yet, the formula of conflict resolution – let the breakaway part go – is still viewed as one of the possible options for Ukraine.

Ukrainian supporters of Pakistani model argue that the complete separation of breakaway territories will solidify the nation as a big region sharing mostly pro-Russian and pro-Soviet views will be no longer influence Ukraine's political and geopolitical choices. Also, there is a very clear economic benefit – Ukraine will not have to spend money for restoration of conflict-affected economy. Yet, this approach is bearing quite dangerous risks – first of all, giving up on Donbas will be negatively received by Ukrainian society, especially those who fought for it. The nationwide public opinion on this option remains extremely low. Data from Ilko Kucheriv Democracy Initiatives Foundation (DIF) 2015, 2017 and 2019 surveys aggregated in Identity, war, and peace: public attitudes in the Ukraine-controlled Donbas research paper [32, p. 15–16] show that only 6,6% of respondents were ready to say good-bye to the breakaway Donbas in 2017, and in 2019 their number dropped to 1,7%. Other nationwide surveys also revealed very low level of support to this option – 3,3% according to Razumkov Center survey [18].

People living in so-called LPR/DPR are not very enthusiastic about idea of becoming an independent state, either. According to DT survey 2019, only 16% of respondents living on the temporarily occupied areas would choose this option [20].

Transnistrian scenario. The previous 4 scenarios are based on assumption that the conflict is brought to the end in that or another way, yet a possibility of having a stretched in time frozen conflict should not be discarded. Moreover, Ukraine is surrounded by examples of unrecognized self-proclaimed "republics": Transnistria in Moldova, Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia (Nagorno-Karabakh hypothetically can be added to this list, but it's not a break-away but a disputed territory between two states – Azerbaijan and Armenia. Besides, the conflict is far from "frozen" – severe military clashes and confrontations reoccur on regular basis, the last one started in May 2021). Yet, this article would focus on Transnistria.

Moldova, alongside other former Soviet republics, declared its independence in 1991. Almost simultaneously, Moldovan territory on the left

bank of the Dniester River, also declared independence as Transnistrian Moldovan Republic. Andrew Williams in his article "Conflict resolution after Cold War: the case of Moldova" writes that Moldova and Transnistria conducted parallel presidential and other elections, with Mircea Snegur being elected in Moldova and Igor Smirnov in Transnistrian Moldovan Republic. From that point each entity took a separate path and pursued own political, economic and geopolitical agenda. In 1992 a short but violent military conflict broke out, and as a result of armed clashes between Moldovan police and Transnistrian forces, resulting in over 600 people having lost their lives. "A cease-fire was brokered from Moscow in July 1992 and Russian Federation peace-keeping forces have remained ever since to separate the two sides in a Security Zone", Williams writes [33, p. 74]. Subsequently, international community undertook multiple attempts to harmonize relations between Chisinau and Tiraspol, but no significant progress was achieved. Maia Sandu, a newly elected president of Moldova, clearly states that integration of Transnistria is on her agenda, yet a settlement is possible upon the complete withdrawal of Russian troops from its territory [34]. Currently, there is no sign indicating that such withdrawal will happen any time soon.

Transnistria and break-away Donbas have lots in common: so-called "referenda" – 2014 were used be separatists' leaders as a premise for declaration of some form of independence from Kyiv. The only question on the ballot was "Do you support The Act on state independence of Donetsk/ Luhansk People's Republic?" and according to the makeshift local election officials, 89% of Donetsk residents and almost 96% of Luhansk residents gave a positive answer [35]. The results of the referenda were not recognized by Kyiv and international community. The biggest difference is that Russia openly established its presence in Transnistria, while it keeps officially denying its involvement into the Donbas conflict. Ukraine can also take this path, following the "better to have a bad peace than a good war" logic. Ukrainian break-away regions de facto copy-paste Transnistrian practices by conducting own elections, establishing internationally unrecognized authorities and trying to conduct some economic activities. It can be said without exaggeration that development vector of both Transnistria and separatists-controlled parts of the Donbas is being shaped in Moscow, and, moreover, Russia can influence home and foreign agenda of both Kyiv and Chisinau [13].

Having a frozen conflict on its territory maybe not the best option, yet it seems to be quiet realistic, given that better options are not possible and worse options are not desirable. A 2019 Rating Group survey shows that 38% would support an idea of military de-escalation and temporarily "freezing" the conflict [36]. It's worth noticing that the option of "frozen conflict" was one of four available, alongside granting autonomy to Donbas, granting independence and continuing military campaign till Ukraine regains control over the region (no option of peaceful / diplomatic resolution was offered). According to the recent opinion poll conducted by Ukrainian

Institute of Future, 21% of respondents think that now is not a good time to bring temporarily occupied Donbas back and it's better to freeze the conflict and wait for a peaceful way to resolve it [37].

Conclusions and suggestions. Current political conditions inside (political turbulence, COVID-19 negative social and economic impact, slow economic development) and outside Ukraine (Russia's military build-up close to Ukraine's border, unstable situation in Belarus) will affect further developments in Donbas. Although most Ukrainians would prefer a peaceful political settlement with Donbas and its return on Ukraine's terms (a version of *German scenario*), the implementation of this idea seems to be problematic, as the other side does not reciprocate. Peacebuilding efforts will require time and resources, as it's not about re-attaching territories, it's about building ties between people living on both sides of the contact line.

Croatian scenario doesn't have strong public support at the moment and does not look feasible, as it can only happen if Russia withdraws from Donbas, but, at the moment it's increasing its presence in both troops and equipment in close proximity to Donbas. *Pakistani scenario* is the least favorite choice and despite it might seem like a quick solution, it will not make Ukraine's life easier as it might give a green light to other separatism-prone regions. Not the most desired but very probable options remain on a scale between a *Bosnia-type* solution (reintegration of temporarily occupied areas with some sort of autonomy) and keeping things as they are while preventing deterioration of the situation (*Transnistria scenario*). All these models are based on thorough research of precedents, so they can not be simply copy-pasted in Ukraine. So, in order to better define probabilities and best practices that can be applied in Ukraine, more profound research is needed. In particular, it's mandatory to trace the dynamics of public opinion regarding issues connected with the conflict in Donbas; analyze best practices in modern conflict resolution and establish communication bridge across the contact line. Also, it's important to update the conflict resolution scenarios in accordance with the global and domestic developments, which should become a topic for further research.

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Маркович О. В. Інтеграція, відмежування або заморожений конфлікт: сценарії розвитку ситуації на тимчасово окупованих територіях Донбасу та особливості суспільних настроїв стосовно кожного з них

Стаття побудована на аналізі вірогідних сценаріїв розвитку та вирішення конфлікту на Донбасі. Актуальність вибраної теми є досить очевидною для України: хоча військові дії на сході країни наразі тривають і градус напруги між сторонами конфлікту залишається досить високим, проте питання майбутнього розвитку тимчасово окупованих територій є одним із пріоритетів уряду України. Оскільки для незалежної України ця проблема нова і прецедентів дотепер не було, учасники переговорних процесів стосовно статусу Донбасу, медіа та науковці аналізують досвід інших країн для визначення стратегій завершення конфлікту та подальшої роботи з територіями, які були вражені воєнними діями. Увага у статті сфокусована на таких сценаріях розвитку подій, як реінтеграція (за боснійським, німецьким чи хорватським сценарієм), політичне й економічне відмежування бунтівної території від центру (за пакистанським сценарієм), заморожений конфлікт (за придністровським сценарієм). Внутрішня ситуація в Україні та зовнішня геополітична кон'юнктура вказують на те, що політичний і дипломатичний вибір України, скоріш за все, буде обмежений певною варіацією боснійського сценарію. Однак ця модель створює лише ілюзію вирішення конфлікту, а насправді його просто локалізують. Такий розвиток подій закладає значні ризики нівелювання євроатлантичних прагнень України, оскільки нелояльний до Києва регіон матиме змогу впливати на внутрішню й зовнішню політику держави. Також є досить висока ймовірність розвитку донбаського конфлікту за придністровським сценарієм, а це означає, що Україна може отримати заморожений конфлікт на своїй території, який буде постійним джерелом напруги не лише у країні, а й у регіоні. Три інші сценарії є менш вірогідними. Хорватський варіант можливий лише в тому разі, якщо Російська Федерація відмовиться підтримувати ДНР/ЛНР матеріальними й військовими ресурсами, що відкриє Києву можливість повернути тимчасово окуповані території шляхом проведення військової операції. Німецький варіант потребує значних матеріальних і часових ресурсів, адже тут ідеться не про фізичне приєднання населених пунктів, а про зміну ментальної картини населення по обидва боки лінії розподілу. Пакистанська модель, попри певні економічні переваги, закладає суттєві загрози як для внутрішньої стабільності, так і для територіальної цілісності України, оскільки є можливість спроби застосувати ці практики в інших регіонах України.

Ключові слова: конфлікт на Донбасі, реінтеграція, вирішення конфлікту, сценарії вирішення конфлікту, тимчасово окуповані території.